From 1770 to 1914, the British Government collected weekly price and quantity data for all types of grain traded in many market towns; these 'Corn Returns' were published in the London Gazette. We computerised the data published 1770-1864, totalling around 6 million data points. Here we describe the nature of these data; discuss why, when and how they were collected; consider their accuracy and biases; describe how we computerised them; and offer caveats in using these -and similardata. We highlight the problem of drawing valid inferences in the face of price impact from fluctuating grain quality and rising imports.
Introduction
The British Government made concerted and sustained efforts to monitor the grain trade throughout England, Wales and Scotland, 1770-1914 . At its minimum, this project involved collection and publication of weekly prices for five different grains for 44 counties or regions; at its maximum, it covered weekly prices and quantities traded for seven grains for 290 towns. In total, the Government collected in excess of 6 million data points, . Generally referred to as the Corn Returns, they have been widely used to construct cost of living indices 4 , measure market integration 5 , infer rates of return on commodities 6 , and even explain cognitive ability 7 . We computerised all the available data up to 1864 to analyse market integration and other aspects of British economic development. Several recent studies using British grain prices utilize the data set we created, which we describe here. 8 Given their importance in economic historical analysis -international comparative work, as well as purely British research -remarkably little consideration has been given to the characteristics and qualities of these data. Nothing systematic has been written on the subject since Vamplew's critique 32 years ago. 9 He cast doubt on their representativeness but his critique contains several inaccuracies and misunderstandings that we set straight here. We introduce the data to a wider audience so that other researchers can use them with a just degree of confidence. Some data have already been placed in the ESRC data archive, some we are making available alongside this paper and the rest will be made available in the near future.
Such a broad and long data set inevitably varies over time, in terms of data collected and format adopted. Hence numerous issues must be considered in a comprehensive survey of the Corn Returns. However, given how frequently the basis and format of modern government statistics change, it will be a pleasant surprise to most economists how unchanging were the Corn Returns through 135 years.
Section 2 begins by considering the historical background to the Corn Returns -why, when, where and how they were collected and published. Section 3 considers the accuracy of the Corn Returns data set. Section 4 considers potential biases in the data. Section 5 provides some simple data description. Appendix 1 contains a full list of towns for every period. Appendix 2 discusses nomenclature. Appendix 3 establishes the county allocation of Bristol (physically split between two counties).
Appendix 4 examines London data deficiency. Appendix 5 outlines the data collection process. Appendix 6 considers missing observations.
Historical background of the Corn Returns.
The Government attempted to regulate the domestic grain price between the 1690s and 1840s, using a raft of legislation known as the Corn Laws. 10 Regulatory aims were two-fold. First, the Government wanted to keep up prices to encourage investment in agriculture and generate an increase in productive capacity. 11 This was seemingly successful, since farmers undertook investments that led to permanent increases in productive capacity, such as reclaiming land in marshy areas. 12 Second, the Government wanted to smooth domestic prices to insure farmers and consumers against excessive fluctuations. 13 Grain was the staple food item of the population and demand was highly inelastic; since grain harvests fluctuated wildly from year to year, smoothing prices was difficult. When grain output and prices were about average, imports were subject to high tariffs (sometimes banned) to raise domestic prices and encourage agricultural investment. In plentiful years, prices fell very low and the Government reacted by giving farmers an export bounty (i.e. it paid farmers to export grain and remove it from domestic markets). 14 In years of dearth, the price rose very high and there was no tariff to pay (i.e. there was a de facto price ceiling lying somewhere above the world price, as determined by the declining tariff schedule).
Regulating domestic prices was difficult without official price series. 15 Initially, importation and exportation were based on the honour system -and hence widely abused. 16 To import grain tariff-free, the captain of a vessel simply had to swear before a local worthy that market prices in the port were above a certain (high) price laid down by statute; to export grain and claim the bounty, the captain simply had to swear before a local worthy that market prices in the port were below a certain (low) price laid down by statute. 17 It happened that vessels loaded with grain arrived one day tariff-free (the captain swearing that prices were high) and departed next day claiming the bounty (the captain swearing that prices were low). Obviously, this could happen only if grains prices fell enormously overnight. In fact, it was widely reported that perjury was rampant -on the part of captains and local worthies, being in cahoots -and the Government was effectively being turned into a 'money pump'. 18 Customs
Service corruption was also problematic. 19 Eventually, deficits mounted in the Treasury grain department because it paid more in bounties than it collected in tariffs. 20 Parliament then acted to prevent further abuses. The solution from 1770 onwards was to compile an official grain prices series. Thus the Corn Returns were born.
Precise details of how the system operated in the first few years are unclear because many Parliamentary papers for that period were lost when the old Westminster Palace (the home of the Houses of Parliament) burnt down in 1834.
However, we know the outlines for the early period and have detailed information from 1791 onwards. By the Act of 1770, local Justices of the Peace (JPs) were required to send to London weekly price data drawn from two to six market towns in their jurisdiction; since a specific list of towns was not stipulated, it is not known which towns were actually monitored under this Act. 21 The JPs appointed a "proper person" residing in each market town to collect prices; how they should be collected was not stipulated. Under the Act of 1781, a newly-appointed Inspector of Corn
Returns reported prices prevailing in the London market, calculated as weighted averages based on sworn trade accounts rendered by every factor trading in the market. 22 The Act of 1789 extended this system nationwide. 23 Inspectors forwarded returns of all sales of domestic produce to a Receiver of Corn Returns in London. 24 The Receiver calculated average prices for each county and each District (Districts being groups of contiguous counties), together with national average prices.
How effective was this administrative machinery and did it change over time?
One relevant metric is completeness of the returns. Figure 1 opened or closed to grain importation in response to average prices. 25 Farmers and landowners desired high prices; corn factors and industrialists sought free trade (implying lower grain prices and lower wage bills for industrialists). 26 Official price series were therefore a battleground because changing the calculation method of average prices could affect the likelihood of ports opening to trade. This in turn meant the Corn Returns were subject to widespread public scrutiny and frequent consideration was given to refining them. 27 Even after the Government ceased regulating domestic grain prices -at Corn
Law repeal in 1846 -the Corn Returns continued to play an important economic role.
Traditionally, farmers paid a ten per cent tithe on output to the Church of England.
But both sides recognised that taxes on marginal product discouraged farmers from raising output; and tithe collection (with its necessarily invasive inquisition into production of each farmer) made the clergy very unpopular. 28 Hence, the 1836 Tithe Commutation Act introduced a "corn rent". 29 That is, farmers agreed to pay the Church each year the money equivalent of a fixed number of bushels of each grain type. 30 This eliminated disincentive effects of taxation because farmers collected every extra unit of output; but it also meant that in high price years, when farmers had high incomes, the Church received higher tax revenues. Tax rates per bushel were set according to official price series from the Corn Returns, averaged over the preceding seven years. 31 Recall that the Corn Returns include only domestic grain in their calculations. This was ideal because both farmers and Church wanted corn rents to reflect prices that farmers were actually receiving for their output. In fact, much of the analysis of the Corn Returns in the late nineteenth century (such as Parliamentary enquiries of the 1870s) was prompted by farmers and Church leaders trying to improve their economic position by revising Corn Return reporting methods.
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So the Corn Returns were produced by a peculiar set of circumstances -the desire to regulate taxation or international trade by reference to market prices of domestically produced goods. Hence the Corn Returns generated a peculiar data source. They give us prices of only those agricultural goods traded internationally (i.e.
grain products) -but prices based solely on the part of the market not traded internationally (i.e. grain produced and traded domestically). 33 In some ways this generates a very clean data set: for example, there is no quality variation over time due to increased import penetration. In other ways this makes the data of limited use:
for example, the Corn Returns do not give us average prices of grains actually consumed, because imports are excluded. Whether or not the peculiarities of the data are a benefit or a hindrance overall, we certainly need to be aware of them when undertaking any economic analysis.
Data accuracy
We can distinguish four stages in production of the Corn Returns. First, local
Inspectors gathered data, calculated averages for their towns, and forwarded the information to the Receiver of Corn Returns. Second, the Receiver inspected the data for accuracy and computed county averages (in the early period), before sending the results to the publisher. Third, the printer set the relevant London Gazette page and published it. Fourth, we transcribed data into machine-readable format and checked it.
Database accuracy is determined by errors introduced at each stage of production.
Local Inspectors
The 1770 Act required JPs for each county to monitor wheat, barley, oat and bean prices in a number of market towns. 34 The JP had to appoint a resident Inspector of Corn Returns for each monitored town; and, for every return provided, these
Inspectors were paid from the county rate. 35 The JP was also to provide an official Second, some towns furnishing regular returns often seem to have had very low levels of trade. For example, the major port and market town of Bristol -with forty corn factors -reports weekly wheat trade of only around 240 bushels. This is an incredibly low figure, bearing in mind that wheat was the staple food grain and most wheat was traded off the farm into towns. 45 All the major market towns of the kingdom were monitored; so, overall, we might expect to see almost the entire wheat crop of the kingdom passing through monitored markets. In fact, we observe trade volumes equal to only around 25 per cent of total domestic output. 46 What happened to the rest, and is there a systematic difference between grain that we observe and the rest?
First, note that we would expect to see only net output traded in the market.
Caird suggests yields of 27 bushels per acre and seeding rates around 2.5 bushels per acre; so around 10 per cent of total output was retained for seed (as we discuss in more detail below). 47 Grain was also retained for on-farm consumption. Around 10 per cent of the population resided on farms in 1801 (including farmers and their families and farm servants, but not agricultural labourers -who presumably bought their wheat through the market as flour). 48 If people on farms ate like the rest of the population, then roughly another 10 per cent of wheat would be retained on the farm and not enter the market. Around 6.5 per cent of output was "tail corn" (low-quality grain that was not traded, which discuss in more detail below). So around 25 per cent of total output would have been retained on-farm -perhaps more before 1801, when the farm population was proportionately larger and yields were lower (so seed consumed a higher proportion of total output). Nonetheless, we observe only around 25 per cent of total output being traded -rather than 75 per cent -and we must ask why.
The gloomiest interpretation is that grain factors or Inspectors were lackadaisical and bothered to return only some portion of total trade. A more benign interpretation is that a great deal of grain was traded outside the market, and hence would not appear in the returns. selling a large parcel of grain at an inflated price. This would obviously be of great concern to us: it would suggest that some of the prices that we observe are not true market prices, just a fiction. Vamplew notes that, under the Act of 1815, if domestic prices rose above the strike price then foreign grain would be admitted tariff-free for several months -so grain factors could import lots of cheap foreign grain and make a large profit until market prices were driven down to the world price. Hence there might be both a means and an incentive to inflate average prices.
There are four major objections to this argument. First, there is no hard evidence that this ever actually occurred -such as a public scandal or a court case -it was just rumoured that it might do so. Second, not all prices were used to calculate national averages that were used to regulate imports, so in some markets there would have been no incentive to manipulate the price. Third, manipulating market prices
were not so easy. The averages include only those transactions in which grain physically changed hands; factors could include transactions in their returns only once the grain was delivered. In that sense all the transactions that we observe are bôna fide, and not just paper transactions. 57 Fourth, whilst some factors may have wanted to import cheap foreign grain, those holding British grain definitely did not want to allow imports that would drive down prices of the assets they were holding. How important were domestic holdings? The level of imports climbed over the period from around nothing in 1770 to around 43 per cent of domestic consumption in 1851; the 1846 repeal of the Corn Laws led immediately to a five-fold increase in imports, so imports were probably only around 8 per cent of consumption before 1846. 58 Thus the vast majority of grain factors had their money invested in domestic grain, rather than foreign grain, before 1846. If there were any manipulation then it seems more likely that holders of British grain would be working to exclude imports by artificially reducing the averages (i.e. selling under-priced parcels of grain in small markets). No one ever suggested that this occurred.
Receiver of Corn Returns
Returns up to 30 September 1820 reported average prices for each county (but see appendix 4 on London); figure 2 shows the first published return. The averaging procedure finally becomes clear in 1820. Figure 3 shows an excerpt of a data Increased professionalization locally was matched centrally. Town returns were published from 1820, rather than county averages. We then get direct evidence that each return was checked before publication, since some returns are withheld as being an "Incorrect Return". We do not know how incoming data were checked and mistakes discovered; and we cannot be sure that all mistakes were eradicated, since the underlying data are lost. But some indication of accuracy levels is given by the later period, when prices were reported in shillings and pence to three decimal places. 
Publisher
The final link in the information chain is the publisher. However accurately the 
Work of the researcher.
Entering data from paper copies posed various challenges, owing to the scale of the task, the variable (often poor) print quality and numerous changes in format.
Nonetheless, we are confident that we achieved a high level of accuracy. Appendix 5 outlines our approach.
Data biases
The data could be biased in three ways: in geographical coverage (certain regions, or types of regions, over-or under-represented); in temporal coverage (certain years, or periods within each year, over-or under-represented); in the quality of grains traded (high-or low-quality grains more likely to be traded). These biases need not be inherent in the system -they might arise from the way the system operated. In particular, missing observations are not randomly distributed and we need to consider their impact also on data representativeness.
Geographical coverage
We desire a fairly complete geographical coverage. First, we need to know what was happening to market prices in every region to link them to other economic data (to gauge the price effects of local transport and financial structures, and so on). Second, grain production was spread quite evenly across the country, especially before 1840, so we need to monitor every region to know what was happening to aggregate grain production. Uniformity was driven partly by high transport costs making it efficient to produce bulky grain products locally, even if the local climate was poorly suited; and it was driven partly by the organic nature of farming, which required mixed crop and animal production.
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What statistic captures completeness of geographical coverage? Suppose that all farmers lived within commuting distance of a monitored town (close enough that it was economic for them to sell their produce there); then we could say that geographical coverage was excellent. Suppose that no farmers lived within commuting distance; then we would say that the geographical coverage was awful. So let us estimate what percentage of farmers lived within commuting distance of a monitored town and see how close we get to our ideal of 100 per cent. Table 1 reports number of monitored towns per 1 000 square miles in each county in each period. At first glance, the numbers seem rather small -two towns per 1 000 square miles does not sound like dense coverage. However, take a town and drew around it a circle with a radius of 12.6 miles; the catchment area within the circle will be 500 square miles. So a density of two towns per 1 000 square miles implies that (roughly speaking) everyone lived within 12.6 miles of a monitored town.
standard deviation of 5 miles, we know that 84 per cent of farmers travelled 12.6 miles or less. 69 In the vast majority of counties in the vast majority of years (except 1821-8), the density of coverage was higher than two towns per 1 000 square miles;
therefore it is likely that the monitored towns provided market outlets for in excess of 84 per cent of farmers. This is close to our ideal of 100 per cent. 
Temporal coverage
Temporal coverage is very extensive and consistent. Returns were published weekly throughout every year, 1770-1914. Trade volumes varied little through the year for wheat, slightly more for oats. 73 But barley was different. The market was active soon after the harvest in the autumn/winter, with maltsters keen to secure the best quality barley for beer production; then very little was traded over the spring/summer. 
Grain quality
Grain quality varies greatly. Milling a parcel of grain produces several different types of flour, ranked according to fineness. Take a bushel each of high-and low-quality grain and mill them into flour. Low-quality grain produces fewer ounces of flour in total, and a higher proportion of coarse flour -which made lower value bread because consumers required a price discount to persuade them to eat brown bread. 75 The value of a bushel of grain is determined by the value of the bread produced; so lower quality grain (producing a lower value of bread) sells for a lower price per bushel. 77 For each grain type, there was a quality differential between British and foreign produce, and considerable quality variation within the domestic product. This affects grain price data in four important ways.
First, there was a British-foreign grain price differential. The Corn Returns report domestic prices of domestically-produced grain only: foreign grain was specifically excluded. Imported grain was typically lower quality and traded at lower prices. Charles Pratt's grain purchase book shows that, for similar quantities of grain purchased on the same day in the same market, British grain traded at a 6.4 per cent premium (based on multiple pairs of purchases -British and foreign -occurring at various dates). 78 Thus the Returns over-estimate average prices of grain actually consumed in Britain. Moreover, since imports were rising as a proportion of consumption, the strength of this effect was rising over time (i.e. there was growing divergence between average prices in the Returns and average prices of grain consumed). 79 We noted above that imports climbed from nothing in 1770 to around 43 per cent of domestic consumption in 1851; the climb continued thereafter to around 77 per cent of consumption by 1914. This caveat could prove important, for example, if grain prices were used to calculate long run changes in the cost of living.
Given good data on quantities and prices of imported grain, controlling for this effect would be straightforward. However, no one appears to have done so in the literature to date.
Second, regional variation in quality would affect local grain price levels. 80 For example, Lincolnshire farmers grew the wheat variety 'Rivetts' -highly suited to the Lincolnshire climate and having high yields per acre, but selling for lower prices per bushel because it was not good for bread-making. 81 Such variation generates grain price differentials between regions, even with perfectly efficient markets and zero transport costs. Currently, the absence of systematic data on regional wheat varieties before 1914 makes it difficult to control for this effect.
Third, grain quality varied markedly year-on-year, significantly affecting the average price level from year to year. However, this is not apparent from the raw data owing to a confounding effect. Bad weather generates a harvest of low quality and small quantity. Low grain quality puts downward pressure on prices; but small quantity puts upward pressure on prices (being an adverse supply shock). Since demand for grain was very inelastic (being the staple food product) the quantity effect on price outweighs the quality effect. But an important implication is that using timeseries data to estimate elasticity of demand will generate over-estimates of the elasticity -because we under-estimate price increases in years of dearth, owing to the confounding effect of lower quality. Persson notes that economic historical interpretation is very sensitive to price elasticity of demand estimates: an elasticity of -0.5 implies that a five per cent harvest reduction triggers a 10 per cent price increase, whereas an estimate of -0.1 implies that a one per cent harvest reduction triggers a 10 per cent price increase. 82 Failure to control for annual quality fluctuations could move elasticity estimates some way from -0.5 towards -0.1. 83 As far as we know, no one has controlled for this effect, including Persson. 84 This issue is important because food demand models, employing price elasticities, have been used to estimate output back into the eighteenth century. 85 Note further that we need to control for year-on-year variations in flour quality when estimating bread output based on grain output. Given good data available on grain quality effects on bread making, it would be possible to control for these effects. 86 Fourth, grain quality can affect the cycle of grain prices within the year. Some low-quality grain is produced every year in every locality. This "tail corn" constituted perhaps 6.5 per cent of total grain output. 87 Low-quality grain bushels had the same volume as high-quality (by construction). Occupying the same amount of waggon space means it cost the same to send them to market --but low-quality grain had a lower value per bushel. Therefore sending low-quality grain to market was less profitable and we systematically observe trade in high-quality grain. Low-quality grain was kept on the farm for feeding farm servants or fattening animals. 88 However, suppose that prices were unexpectedly high later in the year. Then it would be profitable to send to market low-quality grain that had been expected to be consumed on-farm. Then low-quality grains systematically come onto the market later in the year, putting downward pressure on the upswing in prices and leading us to underestimate it.
Note one further point. It was often not worth sending low-quality grain to market, moving average prices upwards. But the best quality grain did not go to market, either. It was used as seed and traded directly between farmers 89 at a premium of around 11 per cent. 90 Since it would never go via a grain factor and enter the Returns, this moved averages prices downwards.
Overall, grain quality variation was substantial and fluid over time. It must be considered carefully when using the Corn Returns or other grain prices, lest we draw erroneous or inaccurate conclusions.
Missing observations.
Very few observations are missing, 1770-1820 -wheat data being 99.7 per cent complete, for example. Switching from county to town reporting raised the proportion of missing observations -wheat being about 90 per cent complete, for example.
However, more than 90 per cent of missing price observations arise from no trade (and hence no price existing). Appendix 6 offers detailed examination of the missing price pattern (by crop, time period and geographical location). Overall, we believe that missing observations do not devalue or bias the data in any way.
Data description
Consider four main data characteristics: long run price movements; changes in relative prices between grains; short period price patterns; regional price variation. barley and oats in the returns, but in 1884 (the first year of the agricultural census for which relevant output data are available), the proportions of total output traded in the returns are 31 per cent and 32 per cent respectively. 47 Caird, English agriculture, 522. 48 Brunt and Meidell, 'How fast'.
49 For a discussion, see Fay, 'Price control', 151-2.
50 Buying "on the stalk" was known legally as engrossing and was outlawed until 1772, although it may still have occurred before then; see Gras, Evolution, 130-2.
Farmers selling on the stalk may have received a lower price; this would reflect both cost of credit being extended by the grain merchant and partial insurance being offered (merchants paid per acre, with only minor ex post adjustments in cases where the harvest was unexpectedly high or low). There is no reason to suppose that the grain itself was systematically different to grain that traded in the market. 51 Evidence of Alexander Craig: British Government, 'Select Committee', 266. 31 George III, cap. 30, § 67. reached the same conclusion. For example, comparisons of regional ('customary') measures, and their relationship to standard measures can be found in British Government, 'Select Committee', This acceleration occurred in two stages. The delay for English returns was initially cut to 10 days by bringing forward publication of the Returns to the Tuesday edition of the Gazette. The delay was then cut by another three days by bringing forward the publication of the Returns to the Saturday edition once again.
67 London Gazette, 20 November 1824.
68 To see that grain production was spread fairly evenly, consider the 1867 county agricultural returns. For each county, calculate the proportion of land under each crop (as a percentage of crop land or as a percentage of total agriculture land). Take the coefficient of variation of these county percentages, which tells you how variable they are. A perfectly evenly distributed crop has a coefficient of variation of zero; an unevenly distributed crop, such as hops, has a coefficient of 360. The coefficient for wheat (as a percentage of either arable land or total agricultural land) was 27 or 47;
the coefficient for grain crops as a whole was 13 or 34. These are a lot closer to zero Table A1 reports the number of towns monitored for the Corn Returns in each period.
Multiple lines for the same Act, and same number of towns, indicate a change in the reporting format. Table A2 reports the full list of towns in each period. BPP 1890-91, vol. 65, 165) . But the Act makes no mention of London -for which data were definitely collected and reported in the London Gazette, To eliminate ambiguities, we adopted modern names and spellings for all towns, 1770-1914, as used by the Ordnance Survey. Except for Brigg and Cann, modern spellings are close to the original returns and anyone using our data will find it straightforward to match up the lists of towns that we report and the lists reported in the London Gazette. Entering data from paper copies posed various problems, especially from 10
Moule, T. (1836
November 1770 (when publication began) to 8 March 1823. The London Gazette is available in various libraries, or on microfilm, but it is inconvenient to transcribe the data in situ and our data were mostly transcribed from photocopies. Very faint printing or considerable bleed-through from the next page were problematic. Figure 1 provides an example of the hard copy quality; the publisher used a very small type, tiring to read for prolonged periods. These data had to be transcribed manually, which was painfully slow but extremely accurate. We randomly double-checked two weeks (after the checking process described below) and found data entry to be 100 per cent accurate.
Publication quality improved on 15 March 1823. Pages became less cluttered because regional sub-totals were suppressed, allowing the use of a larger font. Returns for 150 towns were spread over four whole pages; from 29 April 1842, returns for 290 towns were spread over eight whole pages. Printing and paper quality were much higher and there were no legibility problems. We used a variety of procedures to enter these data, including manual typing and scanning with Optical Character Recognition (OCR) software. Scanning was less accurate than typing but much faster (averaging 5 000 digits entered per hour, including data management tasks, rather than 2 000 digits per hour). We randomly double-checked two weeks (after the checking process described below) and found data entry to be 97 per cent accurate. Inaccuracies arise because the OCR software sometimes misrecognises digits, usually if the printing is blotchy or the paper flecked. Typical errors are numerals 3 or 6 being mistaken for numeral 8.
Following raw data entry, we undertook various checks to attempt to eliminate transcription errors.
First, published data up to 1820 are simply prices per bushel in shillings and pence. Graphing the data for each year for each county allowed us to pinpoint suspicious price jumps. Notably, errors in entering shillings lead to price jumps of 12, jumps of 12 or 24 pence stood out. Hence any transcription errors that we failed to notice probably come from the pence column and are therefore likely to be small.
Second, published data after 1820 report total value and total quantity of each grain traded in each town. Most of the data were scanned from photocopies that were very dark (sometimes illegible) along the edge bound into the spine of the volumes;
for every page for every week we checked columns closest to the spine to ensure correct scanning. We also checked the page ordering (sometimes pages were bound together in the wrong order, something not always apparent at first glance). Average unit prices were then calculated, dividing total value traded by total quantity traded.
We wrote a programme highlighting highest and lowest prices each week for each type of grain; these were typically erroneous and had to be corrected.
Obviously, we desire 100 per cent accuracy in data transcription, and could achieve it if all data were entered manually and checked graphically. However, the increased accuracy would not justify the additional cost. An alternative way of conceptualizing the problem is choosing between entering 100 per cent of the data with 97 per cent accuracy and entering 40 per cent with 100 per cent accuracy. It seems clear that precision of our estimates (for example, using regression techniques)
will be higher if we collect 100 per cent with 97 per cent accuracy. Hence we believe the data collection process was optimized to steer the best course between two pitfalls.
Appendix 6. Missing observations.
Consider first the period after 7 October 1820, when returns for individual towns were published (not just county averages). Price observations can be missing for four reasons, and the cause of each missing observation is described according to the following system. Return', so we treat them the same way.
Fourth, no trade might occur, recorded as 'None Sold' or, when just one or two crops, a dash in that particular column or columns ' -'. When there was no trade then we enter a zero for the quantity. But, in the absence of trade, we do not observe a price and hence we have a missing price observation. In early 1821, the legend 'None Brought for Sale' was employed (for example, 31 March 1821). Presumably, the use of 'None Sold' then indicated a situation where grain was brought for sale but there were no buyers. However, this distinction was soon dropped and only 'None Sold' appeared thereafter; we treat the two cases in the same way.
Our grain price spread sheets do not describe why particular prices observations are missing. But we may wish to know why price data are typically missing -whether it was due to no trade or poor reporting -and an additional spread sheet records this fact. Finally, up to 30 September 1820, grain prices were published as county averages. Causes of missing price observations were not revealed. The Receiver would not publish a county average if fewer than two thirds of Inspectors made a return. Returns from various Inspectors within a county could be missing for a variety of reasons, so it may not be straightforward to reveal why a price observation was missing. The frequency of each type of missing observation after 1820 suggests the most likely explanation for missing observations before 1820 is simply 'None Sold'. Table A5 reports how much data we have for each crop for English and Welsh counties (as a percentage of the total possible amount of data, given the number of counties and weeks, 1770-1820). Notice that beans are noticeably lower than the rest.
Bean prices are basically never reported in Wales, Cornwall, Devon, Derbyshire and Cheshire, probably because very few beans were produced in those counties. The 1867 agricultural census reports vanishingly small acreages of beans in Wales, Cornwall and Devon; and very small acreages in Derbyshire and Cheshire. Hence there was probably virtually no trade in beans in those counties. By contrast, bean prices are reported almost every week in the other counties. One further point is worth noting. Publishing county averages up to 1820, even if one third of towns did not report, could generate measurement error owing to a non-constant sample of towns. There is no way to further illuminate this issue.
The proportion of price data missing from the Returns is very low and heavily concentrated in a few remote towns, such as Lampeter. We can afford to exclude those towns from our analysis (regional coverage being adequate due to complete returns for nearby towns). Hence there is no problem at all with missing observations.
Pea and bean coverage is less satisfactory but -given that the vast majority of missing observations occur because there is no trade, and therefore no price -we do not feel that this weakens the data set.
